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I. INTRODUCTION
What hath Hiibel wrought? It is morning, and you settle down at your
kitchen table with your coffee and newspaper. Glancing at the front page,
you see the headline "Osama bin Laden and General Colin Powell Arrested
in Separate Incidents in Nevada, Each with a Dead Body in the Trunk of
1. "What hath God wrought" is the text of the first message sent via telegraph, by its inventor
Samuel F. B. Morse. The Library of Congress, Today in History: May 24,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/may24.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2004). It is taken from a
biblical verse in Numbers 23:23. Id. Originally, this verse was associated with awe and wonder at
what God had created, but today it is more commonly associated with terror and fear. Grace
Cathedral, What Hath God Wrought!,
http://www.gracecathedral.org/enrichment/brush-excerpts/brush_20040901.shtml (last visited Dec.
14, 2004).
their Rented Cars-Allegedly." In disbelief, you read on to learn that they
were each driving a blue sedan of similar make and model. Further, both
were stopped with reasonable suspicion based on an Amber Alert advising
police to be on the lookout for such a blue sedan which was suspected of
being used in a kidnapping. Aghast, you find out that both were arrested by
separate officers for their failure to identify themselves pursuant to Nevada's
stop-and-identify statute, found to be constitutional in Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial District Court.2 Subsequently, the officers performed searches
incident to their arrests and found bodies in the trunk of each of their rented
cars. "Eureka, imagine the odds! !" you exclaim to your dog, Eureka.
Fast forward a year and both murder cases are at trial. Again settling
into your morning coffee and paper, you see the paper's headline reads this
time, "Osama bin Laden Charges Tossed; General Powell Trial Continues."
You scratch your head only to find out that bin Laden was allowed under the
Court's holding in Hiibel to withhold his name from police because he had a
reasonable belief that his self-identification would be incriminating.
Therefore, his arrest for failure to provide his name pursuant to the stop-and-
identify statute was unconstitutional, and all of the evidence relating to the
body in his trunk was excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. The "Most
Trusted" General Powell,3 however, was not so lucky. Having lived an
honorable and unimpeachable life (despite the body found in his car), he had
no reason to believe that his simple self-identification was incriminating,
and hence he was compelled to provide his name under the statute. His
arrest was constitutional and therefore valid, and all the evidence found
pursuant to the search incident to arrest was allowed at trial. Poor General
Powell. "Well," you say to Eureka, "at least Osama will get his
comeuppance when the local authorities hand him off to the feds." Eureka
yawns and rolls over.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
District Court has been called "the criminalization of silence.",4 The Court's
decision allows the State of Nevada, under penalty of fine or imprisonment,
to compel a person stopped with reasonable suspicion to give his or her
name to the police.5 This is the kind of decision that sends ardent civil
libertarians up in arms about the imminent loss of our freedoms. 6
2. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2460-61 (2004) (reserving the
possibility of arriving at a different result "where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing
identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to
convict the individual of a separate offense").
3. General Powell has been called "The Most Trusted Man in America." CBS News, The Most
Trusted Man in America, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/04/opinion/main539298.shtml
(last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
4. M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called Hiibel: The Criminalization of Silence, 2004 CATO SUP.
CT. REV, 357,357 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/docs/2004/birdcalledhiibel.pdf.
5. It is important to note that constitutional concerns are implicated in analyzing this state
statute because both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have been applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
6. See American Civil Liberties Union, "Your Papers, Please:" ACLU Urges Supreme Court to
Protect Right to Remain Anonymous, Mar. 22, 2004,
http://www.aclu.org/court/court.cfm?ID=15283&c=261; Timothy Lynch, Is it a Crime to Keep
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Hiibel addresses the classic constitutional balancing act between the
acceptable degree of intrusion upon personal rights on the one hand, and the
public need for that intrusion on the other.7 While personal rights are
sacrosanct, the Court has found they are not absolute. Accordingly, Hiibel
grants the public need greater latitude, if only slightly, in such public
concerns that implicate officer safety in the officer's ability to perform his or
her job effectively.' The Court concluded in Hiibel that when one is stopped
with reasonable suspicion, the State of Nevada's seizure of one's name does
not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 9 Additionally, that individual cannot remain silent by invoking
his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination except in cases
the Court deems to be "unusual circumstances," though this phrase is left
undefined. ' As we shall see, what facts the post-Hiibel Court determines as
fitting under the rubric of "unusual circumstances" will establish whether
those facts present constitutional problems.
Hiibel definitively erased a powerful symbolic line seemingly supported
by a wealth of Supreme Court dicta, namely, the right of an individual not to
respond to questions asked by a police officer." While the practical results
of this case will most likely not be significant to the average person, the
implications of this decision should raise the brow of any individual
concerned about his or her civil liberties.
This note will examine the Court's decision in Hiibel and discuss its
implications. Part II traces the history of the Court's decisions regarding
Quiet?, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004, http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-24-04-2.html; Mark Moller,
The End of "The Right to Remain Silent," LIBERTY MAG., July 8, 2004
http://www.cato.org/research/articles/moller-040708.html; Dept. of Justice, Supreme Court: Police
have a Right to stop anyone for no reason at all, Demand their name and Jail them if they refuse to
comply, DOJGOV.NET NEWSWIRE, June 21, 2004,
http://www.dojgov.net/supreme court-privacy.htm; Will Baude, Bad ID, THE NEW REPUBLIC
ONLINE, June 22, 2004, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=express&s=baude060224.
7. For discussions of the Fourth Amendment balancing of interests, see Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at
2459; Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347-54 (2003); Delaware v,. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654-55 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1968). For balancing of interests regarding
the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690-98 (1998); Baltimore City
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 488 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,
427-31 (1971).
8. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9-11. For example, one such limitation to the right of privacy is
reasonableness, as the Fourth Amendment protects only against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures by the government. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1204 (Nev. 2002)
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 9). The court is mindful of the fact that "all rights tend to declare
themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded." Id. at 1206
(citing Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (internal quotations omitted)).
9. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
10. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text for the Hiibel majority's discussion of
"unusual circumstances."
11. See infra note 48 for the history of Court dicta on this issue.
stop-and-identify statutes, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable seizures, and the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.' 2 Part III summarizes the facts of Hiibel. 13 Part IV notes and
analyzes the Court's majority and two dissenting opinions. 14  Part V
discusses the significance of the Court's decision and concludes this note. 5
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Stop-and-Identify Statutes Generally
Stop-and-identify statutes generally permit an officer to ask, or require a
suspect to disclose, the suspect's identity. 16 These statutes have their roots
in English laws forbidding vagrancy, which permitted the police to arrest a
person unless they gave "a good Account of themselves."' 7 Given the wide
variance of activities which an officer could reasonably consider as
constituting vagrancy, these laws have traditionally been found void for
vagueness based upon two factors: i) they do not provide potential offenders
with proper notice of the behaviors that would subject a suspect to the threat
of arrest; and ii) as a result of this lack of proper notice, they permit
unfettered police discretion in the determination of what precise behaviors
violate these vagrancy laws. 8 The Court has acknowledged that this
excessive discretion creates the impermissible risk that these laws would be
used to "cloak... a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but
undisclosed grounds for the arrest."' 9
Like these laws forbidding vagrancy, laws ordering suspects to produce
identification upon a lawful police request 20 cannot be vague, as this
vagueness would allow potentially indiscriminate behavior on the part of
police." Such was the case in Kolender v. Lawson, where the Court
determined that a California statute requiring a suspect to produce "credible
12. See infra notes 16-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 75-245 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 246-60 and accompanying text.
16. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2456 (2004).
17. Id. at 2457.
18. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). The Papachristou Court
noted that the statute at issue employed both "archaic language" and classifications in its definition
of vagrants. Id. at 161. The Court specifically pointed out that laws must be evenly applied to all,
minorities and majorities, rich and poor alike. Id. at 171. The Court warned that this maxim is not
fully honored when the police have too much discretion in their determination of what constitutes
criminal conduct. Id. at 170. For example, the Court cited that the Jacksonville, Florida ordinance at
issue made "nightwalking" a criminal activity. Id. at 163. Florida construed the statute, in an
equally ambiguous way, as criminalizing only the "habitual wanderer." See id. at 163-64 for a
discussion on the matter. See also Alan D. Hallock, Note, Stop-and-ldentify Statutes After Kolender
v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1057, 1058-62
(1984) (discussing the doctrinal foundations of the "Void-for-Vagueness" Doctrine).
19. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 169 (citing People v. Moss, 131 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1955)).
20. See generally infra notes 28-38 for information on what constitutes a lawful police request.
21. See generally Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (stating that a law with an unclear
scope may be used as a "tool" by police to further discriminatory purposes).
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and reliable" identification was void for vagueness. 22  The Court said that
this "credible and reliable" standard was not constitutionally adequate
because the officer had too much discretion to define that standard. 3
Nevertheless, in its decision, the Court clearly implied that there could be an
identification statute that would pass its vagueness test.
2 4
B. Fourth Amendment
"'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law."' 25  The Fourth Amendment
guarantees that a person shall be secure against unreasonable searches or
seizures.26  The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is objective
"reasonableness," determined by examining the totality of circumstances;
consequently, the Court has eschewed applying bright-line rules for this
22. Id. at 353-54, 355-56, 361. Specifically, the Court noted that this statute was more than a
stop-and-identify statute, as it required that "the individual provide a credible and reliable
identification that carrie[d] a reasonable assurance of its authenticity, and that provide[d] means for
later getting in touch with the person who hald] identified himself." Id. at 359 (internal quotations
omitted). However, the dissent thought that the statute was clear "in many of its applications," and
argued that "a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is 'impermissibly
vague in all of its applications."' Id. at 370, 374 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)). Justice White said that because the
majority used the vagueness doctrine in this case, the state will be in "a quandary as to how to draft a
statute that will pass constitutional muster." Id. at 374.
23. Id. at 361-62. The Kolender Court therefore noted that this statute provided a "convenient
tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular
groups deemed to merit their displeasure." Id. at 359 (internal quotations omitted). Similar to
Papachristou, this "discriminatory enforcement" could provide police with an excuse to prevent a
person from leaving (i.e., by arresting an individual) without probable cause. See also Papachristou,
405 U.S. at 169 (stating that the Constitution prevents police from arresting a suspicious-looking
person without probable cause, even when the arrest is for past crimes committed). Since the Court
determined the Kolender statute was void for vagueness, the Court did not resolve any of the Fourth
or Fifth Amendment issues. See Hallock, supra note 18, at 1058-62.
24. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361. The Court noted that it did not "require 'impossible
standards' of clarity" in order to render the statute specific enough to not offend the suspect's due
process rights, and that clarification of the language of the statute at issue was not "impossible or
impractical." Id. (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) (internal citations
omitted)).
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891)).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
determination and instead has emphasized the fact-specific nature of this
reasonableness inquiry.
2 7
The Court has said that Fourth Amendment considerations come into
play before an arrest.2 8  In the landmark case Terry v. Ohio, the Court
allowed a limited seizure with "reasonable suspicion," a new standard not as
stringent as "probable cause;" that is, some seizures were allowed with a
"reasonable suspicion to believe [the suspect] was engaged or had engaged
in criminal conduct" because police safety concerns were implicated.29
Central to this Fourth Amendment inquiry is the determination of whether
the seizure is "unreasonable;" that is, whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception.3 0  The Court noted that there is no ready test for
making such a determination,31 and that therefore the Court makes it based
27. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506-07
(1983) (stating "[w]e do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test... for determining when a
seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop .... [T]here will be ... so much variation that it
is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable
answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment."); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (opining that "[tihere is no formula
for the determination of reasonableness" and that "the reasonableness of a search is in the first
instance a substantive determination to be made ... from the facts and circumstances of the case and
in the light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in opinions of this
Court applying that Amendment.") (internal quotations omitted).
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). Historically, however,
the Terry "stop-and-frisk" has not been subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause. Hallock,
supra note 18, at 1064-65 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
29. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 47 (1979) (discussing Terry) (emphasis added); Terry, 392
U.S. at 30-31. The Court thought it unreasonable to deny an officer the ability to determine whether
the person whose suspicious behavior he is investigating was armed and therefore potentially
dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. The majority noted that this type of situation is dealt with in "an
entire rubric of police conduct" which cannot have, and historically has not, been subjected to the
warrant procedure: the swift action which may be necessary based upon on-the-scene officer
observations. Id. at 20. However, Justice Douglas's dissent vigorously denied the utility of the
reasonable suspicion standard, stating that only probable cause warrants these intrusions upon an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 37-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Of course, the Court
has allowed the use of suspicionless stops to check identification for certain non-criminal purposes,
such as border control. Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Issues, 56 FLA. L. REv. 697, 700 (2004).
30. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. The application of the "reasonableness" standard to the states,
however, was not without its dissenters. Justice Harlan, concurring in Ker v. California, noted that
prior to the Court's decision in Ker, federal searches and seizures have been subject to the
requirement of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness," while state searches and seizures "have been
judged, and in my view properly so, by the more flexible concept of 'fundamental' fairness, of rights
'basic to a free society,' embraced in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ker,
374 U.S. at 44 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan thought that the "further extension of federal
power over state criminal cases," as was provided by the majority's decision in Ker, was "quite
uncalled for and unwise" as states should not be "put in a constitutional strait jacket" or subject to
the "atmosphere of uncertainty" created by the Court's unpredictable decisions involving searches
and seizures. Id. at 45. Justice Harlan would continue to follow the Fourteenth Amendment
concepts of fundamental fairness when judging state searches and seizures. Id. at 46.
31. The Court noted that there is "no ready test [to determine the constitutionality of a seizure]
other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or
seizure) entails." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; see also Brown, 443 U.S. at 50 (stating that "the
reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends 'on a balance
between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers."') (internal citations omitted).
190
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upon the specific, objective circumstances of the particular seizure,32 and
whether the seizure was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place. 33
The Court clearly stated that to allow a limited seizure during a stop
based upon reasonable suspicion,34 the officer must have a justification, an
exigency, beyond general law enforcement needs.35 As we shall see, this
principle will ultimately be the reason why the Nevada Statute at issue in
Hiibel passes Fourth Amendment muster: the Court performed the balancing
test and determined that the governmental interest in compelling
identification under the facts of Hiibel outweighed the individual interests
implicated by allowing such compelled identification.36 However, this
32. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 21 n.18. Officers justifying the intrusion "must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. The Court said an officer's subjective "good faith" is
not enough to justify the intrusion and that good faith alone cannot guarantee that Fourth
Amendment protections survive. Id. at 22. The Court believed that Fourth Amendment protections
are only meaningful when there is some assurance that the conduct of law enforcement officers will,
at some point, be "subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances." Id. at 21.
Therefore, such an evaluation must be made against an objective standard. Id. at 21-22.
33. Id. at 20. A determination of reasonable suspicion "must be based on commonsense
judgments and inferences about human behavior," and not a "scientific certainty" where none exists.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
34. Regarding the "limited" nature of such a seizure, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court reiterated
the proposition that stopping a car and detaining its occupants is a seizure, even if the stop is brief
and its purpose is limited. 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). In examining this case in which police stopped
a vehicle to check the driver's license and registration, the Court balanced the level of intrusion
against the governmental interest for such an intrusion, and determined that the state interest in safe
highways was not sufficient to justify the random stop. 1d. at 650, 658-59.
35. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 52; Hallock, supra note 18, at 1067, 1074. As mentioned, in Terry,
the justification was officer safety. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. The Terry Court said that this exception
must be narrowly drawn, i.e., "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible." Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)). Terry, in
ruling that the stop-and-frisk was constitutional, reserved comment on whether a stop for
interrogation or detention purposes was constitutional, and as such did not give complete approval to
all investigative seizures supported by reasonable suspicion. Hallock, supra note 18, at 1065 (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16). However, Hallock continued, the Court in United States v. Mendenhall
indicated that a majority would support such an investigatory stop with reasonable suspicion without
an officer safety exigency, as did a plurality in Florida v. Royer. See Hallock, supra note 18, at
1068-69.
36. See infra notes 87-88 and 154-60 and accompanying text. A brief discussion of Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Kolender is warranted here. Justice Brennan noted that the government
simply cannot prosecute in the absence of probable cause for failure to produce identification, no
matter how narrowly the statute is drawn. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring). He said that requiring such answers to identification requests denies the
person stopped the ability to leave after a brief period because it gives police the power to seize the
person until he has responded to the officer's satisfaction. Id. at 364. Further, Justice Brennan noted
that the lower burden of reasonable suspicion does not justify placing the innocent in the dilemma of
determining "whether the officers have 'reasonable suspicion,'-without which they may not
demand identification . I..." d. at 368-69. In such a case, he is forced to either refuse the demand at
his peril or acquiesce to the demand, even though no basis for reasonable suspicion exists. Id.
However, this argument is not compelling because a pedestrian is in the same dilemma under
determination begs the question of whether a demand for identification
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court has resolved that when an officer detains an individual for the
purpose of identification, he has performed a seizure of the individual's
"person," subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 37  A detention
for investigation purposes "must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
38
In Brown v. Texas, the Court addressed the validity of a man's
conviction for not complying with an officer's demand for identification
pursuant to the Texas Penal Code criminalizing such non-compliance. 39 The
Court said that although the man's detention was only a brief one, it was
nevertheless a seizure because it "restrain[ed] his freedom to walk away."40
Therefore, in order to be constitutional, a seizure such as this must be
reasonable using Terry balancing and not at the "unfettered discretion" of
police officers.41 Ultimately, the Court determined that the seizure was not
justified at its inception by objective facts (i.e., the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion) and hence was unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional.4 2
The Court has suggested, however, that even though the reasonable
suspicion exception for pat-down searches and seizures carved out by Terry
was a narrow one justified only by the officer safety exigency, the Court
would still allow certain other seizures with reasonable suspicion. For
example, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the
seizure of a person's fingerprints based only upon reasonable suspicion.4 3 In
such a case, the officer must have a "reasonable basis for believing that
fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with [a
particular] crime," and additionally, the procedure must be "carried out with
dispatch." 44
Terry--namely, how does the pedestrian know that he has to stop, or subject himself to a frisk?
How does he know the officer has sufficient reasonable suspicion to support these actions? He does
not. The Court permitted Brennan's "innocent's dilemma" in Terry, because the
exigency/governmental interest of officer safety was implicated. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. So, the
key question here is whether the governmental interest justifies placing the innocent in that dilemma.
37. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50.
38. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). The Court also said that the investigative
methods used in the detention should be the "least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or
dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id.
39. Brown, 443 U.S. at 48.
40. Id. at 50. The Court reiterated the necessity of balancing the public interest with the
individual's right to be free of such officer interference for seizures that are "less intrusive than a
traditional arrest." Id.; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment "protection against unreasonable seizures also extends to 'seizures that involve only a
brief detention short of traditional arrest') (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)).
41. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-52. This balancing would include a "weighing of the gravity of
the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." Id. at 50-51.
42. Id. at 51-52.
43. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985).
44. Id. This finding is supported by the Court's holding in Davis v. Mississippi, where the Court
acknowledged, in dicta, that officers might be able to fingerprint without probable cause within
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The Court, until Hiibel, had never directly addressed the issue of
whether it is permissible for a state to compel self-identification under the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 45  There had been a long line of cases suggesting that such
compelled disclosures were forbidden; but, until the instant case, such
discussion had come only in dicta. For example, the Berkemer v. McCarty
Court concluded that an individual stopped during a traffic stop was not "in
custody" for purposes of Miranda because, at least with regard to custody
issues, a traffic stop was analogous to a Terry stop. 46 The Court noted that
during a Terry stop, an officer may ask a detainee a few questions "to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or
dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to
respond.' 47  Many other cases have adhered to this principle, but merely in
dicta.48
certain narrow circumstances and still be in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, although the
circumstances were not satisfied in that particular case. 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). Also, Justice
Harlan, in his Davis concurrence, said that there may be circumstances, unmet in Davis, "where
compelled submission to fingerprinting would not amount to a violation of the Fourth Amendment
even in the absence of a warrant." Id. at 728-29 (Harlan, J., concurring). As relevant to this
discussion, the Davis majority acknowledged the "unique nature of the fingerprinting process," in
that fingerprinting i) was not a serious intrusion; ii) could not be employed to harass an individual
since police needed to obtain only one set; iii) was an effective and reliable crime-solving tool not
subject to abuses; and iv) presented no danger of destruction. Id. at 727. Unfortunately, the Davis
Court did not specify the "narrow circumstances" in which it would allow the taking of fingerprints
in the absence of probable cause, nor did it make this determination in the circumstances of that case
because there were numerous other Fourth Amendment violations upon which the Court rested its
holding. Id. at 728. The dissent in Hayes acknowledged that the majority's decision, unlike the
majority in Davis, virtually held that "on-site fingerprinting without probable cause or a warrant is
constitutionally reasonable." Hayes, 470 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, Justice
Brennan disagreed with this "regrettable assault on the Fourth Amendment" and thought that the
majority "reach[ed] beyond any issue properly before [the Court in this case] .... " Id. The
majority in Hiibel discussed fingerprinting not in this context, but only insofar as the requirements
attendant to fingerprinting with reasonable suspicion provided a useful parallel for the Court's
finding that an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to provide identification "if the request for
identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop." Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004). The Court said that this finding eliminated
Hiibel's concern that the statute allowed the officer to arrest Hiibel merely for being "suspicious,"
thereby circumventing the probable cause requirement for arrest. Id. The Hiibel Court noted only
that this was similar to the limitation attendant to fingerprinting in Hayes, where the Court suggested
that Terry may allow an officer "to determine a suspect's identity by compelling.., fingerprinting
only if there is 'a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the
suspect's connection with that crime."' Id. at 2459-60 (quoting Hayes, 470 U.S. at 817).
45. Or, as the Hiibel majority framed the question, whether the Fourth Amendment establishes a
"right to refuse to answer questions during a Terry stop." Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
46. See 468 U.S. 420, 439, 442 (1984). The Court noted that a traffic stop had a "noncoercive
aspect" which was similar to a Terry stop's "comparatively nonthreatening character." Id. at 440.
47. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
48. These cases include Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 227 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
366 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 n.6 (noting that it was a "settled
principle that while the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions
C. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination provides that
a person cannot be compelled to give a statement or a writing if that
statement is both testimonial and self-incriminating.4 9 A communication is
testimonial if the government can use its content, as opposed to merely its
"characteristics," to further a criminal investigation of the person making the
statement.5° In order to be testimonial, the communication must "relate a
factual assertion or disclose information,"'" and must rely on "the accused's
consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind .... ,52 "If a
compelled statement is 'not testimonial .. . it cannot become so because it
will lead to incriminating evidence.'
In Hoffman v. United States, the Court held that a communication is
incriminatory if it would support a conviction under a criminal statute and
"furnish a link in the chain of evidence" needed to prosecute the claimant.
54
concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer"); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (addressing the self-incrimination issue in the context of a "police
encounter"). It is important to note that this Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
can be invoked in any proceeding, criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, where the answers
may be incriminating in future criminal proceedings. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003).
However, as author Alan Hallock has noted, for due process vagueness issues, the standard of clarity
required for criminal statutes "is much higher than for statutes that prescribe a civil sanction."
Hallock, supra note 18, at 1059-60 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948)).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V (reading in part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself"). The Court has said that this guarantee against compelled self-
incrimination is to be given a liberal construction "in favor of the right it was intended to secure."
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207
(1988). The Court noted that a witness "is not exonerated from answering merely because he
declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his say-so does not of itself establish the
hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified." Hoffman, 341
U.S. at 486. The Court in Doe held that, in addition to communications, Fifth Amendment
principles apply to certain "acts," such as producing documents in compliance with a subpoena.
Doe, 487 U.S. at 209-10.
50. Doe, 487 U.S. at 207-10. For a further discussion of Doe, see infra notes 215-18 and
accompanying text. Additionally, in another case, the Court noted that an individual may not invoke
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and may be compelled to answer questions
that only "have a tendency to disgrace him or bring him into disrepute" if the proposed evidence is
"material to the issue on trial." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896).
51. Doe, 487 U.S. at 210. The Court noted that the question of whether a compelled
communication is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes "often depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 214-15. A person may be compelled to provide non-
testimonial communications, such as blood samples, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765
(1966), or voice exemplars, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967). The reason for this is that, as the Court noted in United States v.
Hubbell, "there is a significant difference between the use of compulsion to extort communications
from a defendant and compelling a person to engage in conduct that may be incriminating" such as
"provid[ing] a blood sample or handwriting exemplar, or [making] a recording of his voice." 530
U.S. 27, 35 (2000). The Court compared this "conduct" with producing documents under a
subpoena, noting that since the "papers had been voluntarily prepared prior to the issuance of the
summonses, they could not be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence." Id. at 35-36
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-410 (1976)).
52. Doe,487U.S.at2ll.
53. Id. at 208 n.6 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d 1166, 1172 n.2 (Newman, J.,
concurring)).
54. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486; see also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 37-38 (holding that though the Fifth
Amendment "might have been read to limit its coverage to compelled testimony that is used against
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In order for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to be
applicable, the person providing such a communication must have
"reasonable cause to apprehend the danger from a direct answer., 55
However, a plurality Court in California v. Byers noted that under the
Court's holdings "the mere possibility of incrimination is [sometimes]
insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor of a disclosure. 5 6  The
Court said that in order to invoke the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination, an individual must show not only the risk of
incrimination, but also that "the compelled disclosures will themselves
confront the [individual] with 'substantial hazards of self-incrimination."' 57
In upholding the constitutionality of a statute mandating that an
individual involved in an automobile accident must stop at the scene of the
accident and provide his name and address, the Court noted that these
the defendant in the trial itself.... It has, however, long been settled that its protection encompasses
compelled statements that lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence even though the
statements themselves are not incriminating and are not introduced into evidence.").
55. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486; see also Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917) (stating
that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination "is confined to real danger, and does
not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law"). The Court in Mason said that
the danger must be "real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the
ordinary course of things .... [A] merely remote and naked possibility... should not be suffered to
obstruct the administration of justice." Id. at 365-66.
56. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428 (1971); see also Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556-58 (1990) (citing Byers and noting that "[t]he Court has on several
occasions recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege [against self-incrimination] may not be
invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public
purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws."). The Byers Court stated that serious
questions arise when presented with the state's desire for disclosures coupled with the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, and that these questions must be resolved "in terms of
balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on
the other." Byers, 402 U.S. at 427.
57. Byers, 402 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added). The Court noted that this burden was not met in
the Byers case. Id. at 433-34. This determination sparked a lengthy concurrence/dissent from
Justice Harlan, and vociferous dissents from Justices Brennan and Black. Justice Harlan asserted
that though the facts of Byers were sufficient to support a risk of incrimination, that risk was not
sufficient to extend the Fifth Amendment's privilege to regulatory schemes like the one in the instant
case. Id. at 439 (Harlan, J., concurring). He argued that to so extend the Fifth Amendment's
privilege would be to mandate the availability of the privilege in every instance where the
government relies on self-reporting. Id. at 451-52. Justice Harlan asserted that the determination of
whether to extend the privilege was a matter of "degrees" that required an evaluation of the non-
criminal governmental purpose for the statute, the necessity of self-reporting to get the information
needed, and the nature of the disclosures. Id. at 454. Justice Harlan concluded that after Byers
identified himself, the state must bear the burden of making an additional case against Byers for any
criminal violations. Id. at 457. Justice Black supported a "use" limitation for criminal purposes on
this compelled information, and claimed that Justice Harlan's balancing merely diluted constitutional
guarantees. Id. at 463 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, going even further than Justice
Black, supported only immunity in this case and said that a "use" limitation was not enough. Id. at
478 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was incredulous at the fact that the plurality did not
find a substantial hazard of incrimination here, because Byers was also charged with a violation of a
criminal statute (illegal passing). Id. at 470.
compelled admissions were not testimonial.58 It stated that "[d]isclosure of
name and address is an essentially neutral act," and that such a disclosure,
whatever the "collateral consequences," concerned merely the State's power
to regulate the use of motor vehicles. 59 Therefore, this disclosure implicated
an almost exclusively civil, and not criminal, governmental interest.
Consequently, the Court rationalized that such a release of personal identity
and address information was "no more incriminating than a tax return;" that
is, it did not in and of itself implicate anyone in criminal conduct, but merely
identified an individual.6°
III. FACTS
Police were dispatched to investigate a report of a man striking a female
passenger in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road.6' At the
scene, the officer spoke to the citizen who had placed the call. 62 The citizen
directed the officer to the truck, parked on the side of the road with a man
standing by it and a young woman sitting inside. 63 There were skid marks in
the gravel indicating the truck had come to a sudden stop.
64
The officer approached the man, who appeared to be intoxicated, and
informed him that he was investigating a report of a fight. 65  The officer
asked for identification and the man, asking why the officer wanted to see
58. Id. at 432-33.
59. Id. at 432; see Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002) ("To hold
that a name, which is neutral and non-incriminating information, is somehow an invasion of privacy
is untenable. Such an invasion is minimal at best."). The Byers Court noted that it is possible that
compliance with this statute might lead to prosecution for some "contemporaneous criminal
violation of the motor vehicle code if one occurred, or an unrelated offense, always provided such
offense could be established by independent evidence." Byers, 402 U.S. at 432. But, the Court
stated that this statutory purpose affected only the legal activity of driving and therefore did not
necessarily impinge upon the realm of criminal conduct because it was not a crime under California
law to be a driver who was involved in an accident. See id. at 431.
60. Byers, 402 U.S. at 434. It is important to note that such a release of information in this case
may result in civil penalties, though not necessarily criminal ones. See id. at 430-32, 434. The
plurality stated that though this compelled identification may lead to arrest and charge for criminal
conduct, that result depended upon different facts and evidence; as the Court stated, there is no
constitutional right to "flee the scene of an accident in order to avoid the possibility of legal
involvement." Id. at 434. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court suggested that identifications
which may lead to future prosecutions do not necessarily mandate constitutional protections. Id.
Justice Harlan concluded, with no explanation, that this stop-and-identify statute was testimonial.
Id. at 435-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Black wondered what evidence could be more
testimonial than that offered here-namely, "a man's own statement that he is a person who has just
been involved in an automobile accident inflicting property damage." Id. at 462-63 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted that the plurality, by determining the communication was non-
testimonial, illegitimately adopted a construction at odds with the one adopted by the California
Supreme Court. Id. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He then equated the plurality's non-testimonial
determination with believing that "a statute requiring all robbers to stop and leave their names and
addresses with their victims would not involve the compulsion of 'communicative or testimonial'
evidence." Id.
61. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455 (2004); Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
62. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
63. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203. The young woman was Hiibel's minor
daughter. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
64. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
65. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
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his identification, refused the officer's request.66 The officer responded that
the identification was necessary to the investigation, after which "[t]he
unidentified man became agitated and insisted he had done nothing
wrong." 67  The officer asked for identification numerous times and was
refused each time, after which the man began to taunt the officer,
challenging the officer to take him to jail.68 After warning the man that he
would be arrested if he did not comply with the officer's request, the officer
placed the unidentified man under arrest.
69
The government charged and convicted the man, Larry Dudley Hiibel,
with preventing a public officer from carrying out the officer's duties in
violation of NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2003), 70 which compels a person
to identify him or herself when stopped by a police officer with reasonable
suspicion.71  Hiibel was convicted and fined $250.72 The Sixth Judicial
District Court affirmed Hiibel's conviction,73 as did the Supreme Court of
Nevada in a divided opinion.
74
IV. ANALYSIS & CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion, Joined by Justices O'Connor,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
In this 5-4 Supreme Court decision, the Hiibel Court affirmed the
judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and held that Hiibel's conviction
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203. The record shows the officer asked for identification eleven
times and was refused each time. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
69. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455. The officer stated that he "felt [Hiibel] was intoxicated, and how
he was becoming aggressive and moody, I went ahead and put him in handcuffs so I could secure
him for my safety, and put him in my patrol vehicle." Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
70. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203. The court determined that Hiibel's failure to provide identification
"obstructed and delayed [the] public officer in attempting to discharge his duty." Id. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 199.280 provides criminal penalties for "willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] a
public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office." Hiibet, 124 S.
Ct. at 2455.
71. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003) states that any peace
officer may detain any person under reasonable suspicion, and further, that "[a]ny person so detained
shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer."
Id. at 2455-56.
72. Id. at 2456.
73. In affirming Hiibel's conviction by balancing the public interest in Hiibel's self-identification
with his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the district court held that it was "reasonable and
necessary" for the officer to request Hiibel's identification given that the officer had evidence that
Hiibel drove under the influence and was suspected of battery and domestic violence. Hiibel, 59
P.3d at 1203.
74. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1207-08.
under Nevada's stop-and-identify statute did not violate either his Fourth
Amendment rights or his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.75 After a brief discussion of the history of stop-and-identify
statutes and their roots in vagrancy statutes, the majority asserted that Hiibel
began where Brown v. Texas and Kolender v. Lawson left off.7 6  The
majority concluded that the statute in Hiibel, unlike the one in Kolender, was
not vague because it required the suspect to disclose only his name; and, that
the Terry stop in Hiibel, unlike the one in Brown, was proper because the
arresting officer possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 77
1. Fourth Amendment
The majority decided that, contrary to Hiibel's contentions, neither the
officer's stop and request for identification nor Nevada's stop-and-identify
statute violated Hiibel's Fourth Amendment rights.78 It noted that Terry
allowed brief stops with reasonable suspicion, as well as questioning
regarding the identity of the person stopped. 79 The Court remarked that such
questions were a "routine and accepted part of many Terry stops" and served
several important governmental interests such as: i) informing the officer
that the suspect is wanted for another offense;80 ii) helping the officer clear
the suspect, therefore allowing the police to put their law enforcement
efforts elsewhere; and iii) enabling an officer to know with whom they are
dealing in order to properly assess the situation for threats to the officer's
own safety and the safety of others."'
While acknowledging that it is permissible for a police officer to ask a
person for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment concerns,
the majority recognized the unresolved question of whether the individual,
stopped by an officer with reasonable suspicion, can be arrested and
prosecuted for his refusal to answer the officer's identification request.
8 2
Although the Court acknowledged dicta addressing the issue in its previous
decisions, the majority did not find those statements controlling.83
In an interesting turn, the majority interpreted the dicta as standing for
the proposition that the Fourth Amendment itself cannot compel a suspect to
75. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-6 1.
76. Id. at 2457. The majority reminds us that the Court in these cases did not reach the Fourth or
Fifth Amendment constitutionality of the stop-and-identify statutes themselves, because the
Kolender statute's "credible and reliable" language was void for vagueness and the initial stop by
police in Brown was not based upon reasonable suspicion. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2457, 2460.
79. Id. at 2458.
80. Compelling the release of information which lets the officer know if the suspect is wanted for
an offense may implicate Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues. See infra notes 166-67 and
accompanying text.
81. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457-58.
82. Id. at 2458.
83. Id. at 2458-59. See supra note 48 for the history of Court dicta on this issue.
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answer questions.84 Therefore, because the legal obligation for Hiibel to
answer questions did not arise from the Fourth Amendment specifically, but
rather from Nevada State law, the majority asserted that the dicta was not
applicable because it did not directly address the question of "whether a
State [compelling] a suspect to disclose his name" during a Terry stop
violated the Fourth Amendment.85  The Court claimed that the Hiibel case
concerned "a different issue" than the one to which the dicta applied.
8 6
Because the Nevada statute was the source of the compulsion of
identification, the majority noted that to determine whether requiring a
suspect to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop is allowable under
the Fourth Amendment, one must look at the "reasonableness" of this
seizure under the Fourth Amendment's balancing test, weighing the State's
"intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate government interests."87 The Court concluded the
Nevada statute satisfied that standard because the Court believed that i) the
request for identification had an "immediate relation" to the Terry stop; ii)
the threat of criminal sanction ensured that the identification request did not
become a "legal nullity;" and iii) the statute did not alter the duration,
location, and nature of the stop.88
84. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. M. Christine Klein called this "curious bit of legal 'reasoning'" a
"striking non sequitur," as the majority noted that the Fourth Amendment does not impose
obligations on the citizen, but yet finds it appropriate to draw the obvious inference that the Fourth
Amendment "itself' cannot require a suspect to answer questions. Klein, supra note 4, at 378.
Klein continued, with a hearty "of course" this is the case, that any obligations to answer questions
would "not only not stem from the Fourth Amendment but would arise as an exception or limitation
to the protections offered by the Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment." Id.
85. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (emphasis added).
86. Id. While the majority asserted that this case was "different" than one where it would be
necessary to interpret whether the Fourth Amendment can compel such answers (because the
question of whether a state can compel a suspect to disclose his name needed to be addressed),
Klein, disagreeing, said Hiibel is simply a "garden variety case" to determine whether a state statute
is consistent with Fourth Amendment protections. Klein, supra note 4, at 378. Even though Klein
finds the Hiibel majority's analysis here a "curious bit of legal 'reasoning,"' Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Terry employs a similar bit of reasoning by noting the different justifications
of a protective frisk: one predicated upon a state's general authority in directing its officers and one
predicated upon Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 31-33
(1968). Justice Harlan held that if Ohio had authorized that officers could, on a reasonable suspicion
standard, "frisk and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons," he would certainly
find such actions constitutionally permissible. Id. at 31. However, he noted that since the Ohio
courts did not base the constitutionality of this frisk upon any general authority over officers, this
analysis could not be applied here. Id. at 32. Justice Harlan based his determination of the officers'
"right to frisk" upon the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of his forcible stop. Id. at 33.
87. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. Considerations involve the "weighing of the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual liberty." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d
1201, 1205 (2002) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)).
88. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
With regard to the duration of the stop, an officer would most likely
need to run the suspect's name through his database of criminal history
records if the officer did not immediately recognize any potential danger
from the suspect's self-identification. 81 In fact, other than the pat-down
protections provided under Terry, this "recognition" is essential to the
officer being aware of any risk the suspect posed to previous officers or
others. Although these technologies may provide information
"instantaneously," 90 any problem that would delay the speed of this
determination of potential risk, such as a computer malfunction, could
potentially increase the time of detention past that which the Court would
consider "brief," rendering such a stop unconstitutional.
In addition, the benefit of these advanced criminal history checks to
officer safety is somewhat negated by the fact that an officer must first
approach the vehicle of persons stopped under Terry before the officer is
able to determine whether the individual poses a risk by running his name
through the database. Therefore, in order to assess the risk posed by a
Terry-stopped individual, the officer must, to a limited extent, assume the
very risk that allowing such compelled self-identification is designed to
mitigate.9'
It would therefore be useful to know what percentage of the officers
killed or injured during a Terry stop were attacked upon first contact with
the suspect, and what percentage were attacked only later when the stop
escalated into a dangerous situation. If the latter situation is more prevalent,
then it makes sense, in light of Fourth Amendment balancing, to allow the
initial contact in order to establish the suspect's identity. This information
would help us to ascertain whether the contact would implicate the public
interest of officer safety sufficiently enough to outweigh private Fourth
Amendment considerations. Of course, we would still be unable to know if
the request for identity would likely create a violent situation out of
89. Klein noted that an officer would immediately know if the suspect was a potential danger
only in a small town or in the case where the suspect is infamous enough that his name will be
instantly known; otherwise a database would be necessary. Klein, supra note 4, at 380. However,
police have noted that it is standard protocol to "know the identity and character of as many persons
in [the officer's] district or beat as possible." Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of
Police Organizations in Support of Respondents at 6-7, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S.
Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554) [hereinafter Police Organizations Amicus]. To such an end, officers
are routinely advised on a daily basis of names or descriptions of potentially dangerous persons they
may encounter. Id. at 7. But, the police also stated that "identification by sight recognition" is quite
limited, especially in "metropolitan areas with large, transient populations." Id. Database
technologies enable the officer to access "comprehensive criminal history records" reflecting the
individual's "current and past involvement with the criminal justice system... including arrests, the
leading indicators of a propensity to assault police officers." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "One
common denominator found among victim officers is that they did not perceive their attacker to be a
serious threat until it was too late." Id. at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
90. Police Organizations Amicus, supra note 89, at 8 (noting that the Court, in Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 3 (1995), acknowledged that police cars equipped with these database technologies
conduct "instantaneous searches of criminal history using only detainee names"). For example, the
Los Angeles County Consolidated Criminal History Reporting System can retrieve information in
less than 2.5 seconds. Id. at 7.
91. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text for a full discussion of risks to police during
Terry stops.
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circumstances that would otherwise not have escalated to the point of
violence against the officer.
The majority did not accept Hiibel's argument that the statute
circumvented the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement by
enabling an officer "to arrest a person [merely] for being suspicious." 92
This, said Hiibel, created the very risk of arbitrary police conduct the Fourth
Amendment was designed to prohibit. 93 However, the Court said that this
concern was alleviated by the fact that "a Terry stop must be justified at its
inception and 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified' the initial stop." 94 Therefore, an officer could arrest a suspect for
failing to identify himself only if, pursuant to Brown,95 the officer had
reasonable suspicion for the stop, and the identification request was
"reasonably related" to the circumstances justifying the stop. 96 The majority
concluded that the officer's request that Hiibel identify himself was a
"commonsense inquiry" which was "reasonably related" to the
circumstances of the Terry stop and not merely an effort to obtain an arrest
after the stop yielded insufficient evidence.
97
92. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
93. See id.
94. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The Court noted that this limitation was
similar to the one in Hayes governing fingerprinting, which "compell[ed] the suspect to submit to
fingerprinting only if there is 'a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or
negate the suspect's connection with that crime."' Id. at 2459-60 (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811,817 (1985)).
95. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Brown case.
96. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
97. Id. at 2460. In the Nevada Supreme Court Hiibel case, the court questioned the ramifications
of not legally allowing such a "commonsense inquiry" as identification when the officer had
reasonable suspicion: "[W]hat could an officer do if a suspicious person were loitering outside a
daycare center or school? Perhaps that person is a sex offender. How are officers to enforce
restraining orders? Or, how are officers to enforce curfew laws for minors without a requirement to
produce identification?" Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 2002). In
response, the dissent noted that the majority failed to recognize that "it is the observable conduct [of
an individual], not [his] identity... upon which an officer must legally rely when investigating
crimes and enforcing the law." Id. at 1209 (Agosti, J., dissenting). The majority countered by
stating "it is the observable conduct that creates reasonable suspicion, but it is the requirement to
produce identification that enables an officer to determine whether the suspect is breaking the law."
Id. at 1205-06. Additionally, the court noted that, in this post-9/1 I era of terrorism, denying officers
the right "to request identification from suspicious individuals creates a situation where an officer
could approach a wanted terrorist or sniper but be unable to identify him or her if the person's
behavior does not rise to the level of probable cause necessary for an arrest." Id. at 1206. The
concurrence noted that the majority did not "overreact[]" to the dangers of terrorism in its decision.
Id. at 1207 (Maupin, J., concurring). However, the dissent called this reasoning an "emotional
appeal based upon [the] fear and speculation" that police would be unable to protect children from
molesters, or to enforce restraining orders or curfews. Id. at 1209 (Agosti, J., dissenting). And
further, the dissent maintained that the court should not be "blinded by fear," and that the court
appealing to public fear during this time of terrorism, instead of vigilantly guarding the public's
constitutional rights, would "sound the call of retreat and begin the erosion of civil liberties." Id. at
1209-10.
This determination appears to be a bit self-serving, however, even
though it may be technically "correct." It is difficult to determine exactly
when a request for identification is not reasonably related to the
circumstances justifying the stop, and the Court does not provide any
guidance in resolving this matter.98 The Court held, under facts where an
officer was investigating an alleged assault, that the specific intrusion of
compelling Hiibel to state only his name did not tip the Fourth Amendment
balance in favor of the individual's right to withhold such information. 99 It
is not unreasonable to assume then that an officer can ask for an individual's
name in almost every circumstance where the individual is Terry-stopped,
because given the requirements for a Terry stop, an officer will always have
reasonable suspicion to believe a crime has been or is about to be committed
and therefore his safety is always at risk in such a potentially criminal
situation.1 00
The Court's decision in Hiibel clearly expanded Terry's narrow search
and seizure exception of allowing a limited pat-down search for the purpose
of officer safety when a suspect is stopped with reasonable suspicion.' 1 But
as we have seen, there have been chinks in the Terry armor even before
Hiibel; for example, in both Davis v. Mississippi and Hayes v. Florida, the
Court entertained the possibility of seizing the fingerprints of a stopped
individual with a standard less than probable cause.'02
Since Terry allowed only a brief "intrusion" in light of Fourth
Amendment concerns, the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" balancing
test for compelled self-identification must necessarily consider the extent of
the identification "intrusion. ''°  It is useful to examine, in addition to the
duration and location of each of these seizures (or "intrusions"), '04 the nature
and extent of the seizure, and to compare the seizure with constitutional
Terry pat-down frisks and compelled fingerprinting (which, as we have seen,
98. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-60. Steinbock believed it was "unworkable to ask the officer
on the street to distinguish between stops where identification would further the investigation and
those in which it would not" and that a bright-line rule would make sense here. Steinbock, supra
note 29, at 718.
99. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
100. "Law enforcement experts have long recognized that, when an officer conducts a field
interview, his 'greatest hazard is the unknown."' Police Organizations Amicus, supra note 89, at 5.
101. Klein, supra note 4, at 385; cf Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No.
03-5554) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus] (noting the "exceedingly narrow" stop and frisk exception to
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement in Terry).
102. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text for the Hayes and Davis cases. In addition, in
a case questioning whether an officer stopping an individual had the required reasonable suspicion if
the officer was acting pursuant to a flyer issued by another officer who had reasonable suspicion, the
Court allowed even this identification stop under Terry because the stop promoted a strong
governmental interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). The Court performed its requisite Fourth Amendment balancing test and
determined that the police interests simply outweighed the individual's interests in this case. See id.
103. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
104. See supra notes 37-40, 78-81 and accompanying text.
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the Court suggested was permissible with reasonable suspicion and within
narrow circumstances under the Fourth Amendment). '05
In Hiibel, the Nevada Supreme Court believed that requiring
identification was less intrusive than conducting a pat-down search, as
requesting identification does not require physical "touching."' 0 6 However,
author M. Christine Klein worried that while this may be true, the scope of
the seizure is much greater in a compelled self-identification, as obtaining a
person's identity is merely "the tip of the iceberg."'0 7  An officer in
possession of a person's identity, while using police databases, may obtain a
virtual "torrent" of information about that person, whereas a seized weapon
could not unleash such personal information.'0 8  Presumably, a seized
weapon which an officer determined was lawfully owned and possessed by
the person from whom it was seized would be returned to its owner after the
stop was completed and, unlike a person's identity, could not subsequently
be used to obtain additional information not directly related to the
circumstances creating the reasonable suspicion in the first place-such as
information that could be obtained from ballistics testing to see if a seized
gun was used in the crime being investigated (or in any other crime), or
personal information which could be obtained from "running" the weapon's
serial number. 109
Also, it is likely that a compelled self-identification based on reasonable
suspicion would occur in a substantially greater number of cases than a pat-
down search, as every individual stopped has a name, whereas fewer would
be suspected of carrying a weapon which would necessitate a pat-down
search. So, in these respects, a compelled self-identification could
potentially intrude further than a Terry frisk upon a person's personal
circumstances, situation, history, etc.
105. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-17
(1985).
106. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002). See generally JAMIE
FELLNER, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS, CHAPTER
VII. RACIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE DRUG ARRESTS (2000),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-05.htm (including as a problem the discriminatory
uses of the "pat-and-frisk") (last visited Dec. 14, 2004); Injuryboard.com, Police Misconduct
Overview, http://www.injuryboard.com/view.cfm/TOPIC=125 (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
107. See Klein, supra note 4, at 366-67.
108. Id. at 367. Klein references Justice Stevens's similar point in the Justice's Hiibel dissent. Id.
(citing Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating a name "can provide the key to a
broad array of information about the person, particularly in the hands of a police officer with access
to a range of law enforcement databases. And that information, in turn, can be tremendously useful
in a criminal prosecution.")).
109. See MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, MISSISSIPPI PROSECUTOR'S MANUAL:
CHAPTER 10 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE, at 41, available at
http://www.ago.state.ms.us/divisions/prosecutors/downloads/ProsmanI0.pdf (last visited Dec. 14,
2004).
Somewhat mitigating the "intrusion" into one's Fourth Amendment
rights resulting from compelled self-identification is the fact that states, in
exchange for an individual's use of public roads, can currently compel the
individual to purchase and post license plates on one's motor vehicle. 1 °
License plates allow the police to "intrude" upon the registered owner of a
vehicle, without any reasonable suspicion whatsoever, by entering the
number on the plate into police databases in order to obtain the registered
owner's identity, address, and possible criminal history."' This enables an
officer to obtain any information that a compelled self-identification of the
registered owner of the vehicle would provide. The government here is not
so concerned with the fact that this scheme may, like the hypothetical at the
beginning of this note, furnish greater protections to the car thief (whose
personal information could not be ascertained from a car license database
search) than to the law-abiding registered owner of the car. The fact that
state license plate schemes have not been shown to be unconstitutional,
despite this government "intrusion" upon the persons, houses, papers, and/or
effects of honest motor vehicle owners, is linked to the states' interest in
having such schemes to facilitate traffic management and safety."
2
Likewise, the Fourth Amendment may permit similar "intrusions" and the
potential torrents of information they unleash upon those stopped by officers
with reasonable suspicion, if the intrusion sufficiently implicates important
governmental interests.
Also, the "intrusion" created by compelled fingerprinting, which the
Court might allow with reasonable suspicion in certain narrow
circumstances, is certainly as great as the "intrusion" of compelled self-
identification. Fingerprints are an even more unique form of "identity" than
110. See Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles, Nevada License Plates,
http://www.dmvnv.com/platesmain.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Nevada License
Plates] for the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles website information section on license plates.
111. See David Patch, Test Devices to Serve as Snooper Troopers, TOLEDO BLADE, Aug. 11,
2004, http://tbmews.org/Archives/a1055.htm (describing a recently implemented Ohio police
program which automatically scans the license plate of every car which uses the Ohio Turnpike, and
then cross-references the information with criminal databases). However, the Court has
acknowledged that "[a]n individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to
government regulation." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (finding that stopping an
automobile and detaining its driver solely to check his driver's license and vehicle registration is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
112. See Nevada License Plates, supra note 110. The Court has also noted the states' "vital
interest" in efficient and safe management of vehicular traffic, in such manifestations as "ensuring
that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit
for safe operation, and hence that the licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are
being observed." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658. However, as the Court noted, this interest may not
always be sufficient to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests of such stops. See id.
at 659-60. In addition to concerns regarding traffic safety, the Court has determined that the state
has a legitimate concern stemming the tide of illegal immigration. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975). The Court stated that this interest enabled officers, with reasonable
suspicion that a specific vehicle might contain illegal aliens, to briefly stop those vehicles and
question the occupants about their citizenship, immigration status, and any suspicious circumstances.
See id. at 879-80, 884. However, as the Court only addressed the constitutionality of the stop itself,
it did not resolve whether the answers to such officer-posed questions may be compelled. See id. at
885-87.
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one's name, as two people or more can have the same name but not the same
fingerprints. 13  Fingerprints may also be referenced against government
databases to obtain similar "floods" of information about the individual as
that available to officers by one's identity, provided the individual's
fingerprints are recorded in such databases. 
114
However, the circumstances under which the Court purported to allow
fingerprinting without probable cause are not necessarily analogous to those
under which a person's identity might be obtained. "5 Although the process
of obtaining a suspect's identity could clearly be "carried out with dispatch,"
it is less clear whether officers would have a "reasonable basis for believing
that [identification would] establish or negate the suspect's connection with
[the] crime [being investigated]." '" 6  In order for officers to have such a
reasonable basis, the facts would have to be similar to those in United States
v. Hensley, in which the Court upheld a stop for the purposes of
identification with reasonable suspicion based only on a flyer issued with
reasonable suspicion by another police department. 117  There, officers
stopped the suspect to check identification to determine whether he was the
specific person in the flyer for whom they were searching.'" This
113. See Peel Regional Police, Fingerprints, http://www.peelpolice.on.ca/FIS/FIS-Print.html (last
visited Dec. 14, 2004). Fingerprints are left by the patterns of ridges and furrows on the skin which
assist traction; through its pores the skin discharges water, salts, and other organic matter which are
left behind when one touches an object, and when the water evaporates, those other materials are left
behind as "fingerprints" to be potentially found by police and used for identification purposes in a
criminal investigation. Id. See generally Katherine Ramsland, Fingerprints and Other Impressions,
Chapter 4: The Techniques,
http://www.crimelibrary.com/criminalmind/forensics/fingerprints/4.html?sect-21 (last visited on
Aug. 28, 2005) (noting the techniques and long history of fingerprinting as a crime-solving tool).
114. See Martin Stone, FBI's Online Fingerprint Database, COMPUTERUSER.coM, Aug. 11, 1999,
http://www.computeruser.com/newstoday/99/08/ll/news6.html; Paul Roberts, Fed Fingerprint
Database Spreads Across U.S., CIO MAGAZINE, May 15, 2004,
http://www.cio.com/archive/051504/tl-justice.html.
115. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
116. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811,817 (1985).
117. 469 U.S. 221,232 (1985). The majority thought such a rule "common sense" in a time when
"criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional
boundaries" because it allows officers in one jurisdiction to act quickly "in reliance on information
from another jurisdiction." Id. at 231.
118. Id. at 223-24. The Court noted that it is in the public interest, particularly in crimes involving
a threat to the public safety, that the suspect be captured as promptly as possible and that
"[r]estraining police action until after probable cause is obtained would not only hinder the
investigation, but might also enable the suspect to flee in the interim and to remain at large." Id. at
229. The Court continued that the law enforcement interest in the circumstances of this case
"outweigh the individual's interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more extensive than
permissible in the investigation of imminent or ongoing crimes." Id. The Court did not find the
distinction significant that police can more justifiably rely on a "report that a magistrate has issued a
warrant than on a report that another law enforcement agency has simply concluded that it has a
reasonable suspicion sufficient to authorize an investigatory stop," because the intrusion here upon
personal security is "minimal," while the law enforcement interests promoted by this rule are
"considerable." Id. at 232. Justice Brennan in his concurrence noted that "in the case of intrusions
205
compelled self-identification allowed the officers to instantly determine
whether the individual stopped was the specific individual whom police
were seeking, and if he was not, to quickly allow the individual to go about
his business.
This was not the case in Hiibel, as police were not looking to eliminate
or confirm Hiibel as being a specific suspect, but rather were investigating a
general call regarding an alleged assault. 1 9  It is unclear how Hiibel
revealing his name would establish or negate his connection with the
claimed assault, even if police subsequently determined he had a criminal
record. 120 Additionally, as noted by author Klein, this Hensley prerequisite
to compelling identification-establishing or negating the individual's
connection with the offense-countered the majority's own assertion that
under the facts of Hiibel, "[t]he officer's request was [merely] a
commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify
after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence."'
' 2 1
In addition to the degree of intrusion upon an individual, the other side
of the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" balancing test is the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests. 122 The governmental interests cited by
the majority may have some merit. 1 3  While it is unlikely that an
individual's compelled self-identification would help "clear a suspect and
allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere," it could certainly
inform the officer that the suspect is wanted for another offense or has a
record of violence or mental disorders, provided that the officer uses the
police databases created for these purposes. 124
properly classifiable as full-scale arrests for Fourth Amendment purposes, no such balancing test is
needed" as such "arrests," even under Terry, are governed by the probable-cause standard in the
Fourth Amendment text. Id. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring). However, it must be noted that as
Hensley was a case questioning whether the police could adequately rely on a flyer issued by
another police department who had reasonable suspicion, again the Court did not address whether
the suspect could be compelled to identify himself. See id. at 231-32.
119. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455 (2004).
120. Police were investigating a third-party citizen's report of an assault, and thus were not even
certain a crime had been committed. Id. at 2460 (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 392 U.S. 811, 817
(1985)).
121. Klein, supra note 4, at 384 (citing Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460) (internal quotations omitted).
122. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
123. However, the ACLU believes that the Court "fails to substantiate any specific law
enforcement interest that might justify such a serious abridgement of... rights." ACLU Amicus,
supra note 101, at 5. Another governmental interest implicated in compelling identification, but not
mentioned by the majority, is the "possibility that widespread noncompliance with requests for
identification by law enforcement officers would impair law enforcement beyond the point of a
general interest." Hallock, supra note 18, at 1074. However, as Hallock notes, whether this rises to
the level of a significant governmental interest is problematic. Id. at 1075. He mentions Justice
Brennan's Kolender concurrence, which posited that an officer could most likely secure compliance
with a request for identification, even without the proper statutory authority, by a 'show of
authority' or posing his requests in a manner calculated to elicit a response." Id. at 1074. However,
it is not unreasonable to assume that those who would not comply with an officer's request for
identification, if such a request was not supported by the full force of law, might likely be those
persons who would pose the greatest risk to officer safety, such as those with some experience in the
criminal justice system, or those that are anti-social or inebriated, like Hiibel.
124. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458. This compelled self-identification, in light of the possibility
of being wanted for another offense, creates clear Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues which
are addressed in infra Part IV.A.2.
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Also, while it is true that "[t]he exigencies that justify a weapons search
simply do not arise in the case of compelled identification, '125 a compelling
case may be made that officers who possess the requisite reasonable
suspicion in stopping an individual are subjected to a significant enough risk
to justify the limited seizure of a person's identity under the Nevada statute.
"[I]nformation about the stopped person's dangerousness or past violent
activity can save [an] officer's life." 126 In one study, of the six hundred-plus
officers killed in the last decade, one hundred and five were killed
"investigating suspicious people or circumstances in a Terry-type
situation." 127  According to another study, seventy-two percent of the
individuals who killed police officers over a fourteen-year period had been
arrested at least once in the past 128 and though it is not clear how many of
those killings occurred during a traffic stop, instant access to records of
those arrests, if in the police databases, could serve as an extraordinarily
valuable tool for mitigating the risk to officer safety.1 29  Also, individuals
who assault officers have traditionally used hand-to-hand combat,
automobiles, or the officer's own gun in such assaults, none of which could
be guarded against by a Terry frisk. 13 0
These considerations cannot be lightly dismissed, although the Court
reasons that "[c]ivil liberties can impede effective police work."' 31  Even
Terry, that constitutional bulwark of police procedure, can be painted with a
similarly terse brush as it most certainly curtailed many important civil
liberties; in particular, the individual's right to not be physically touched or
grabbed by the police under a standard of less than probable cause. 13 2  So,
the relevant concern in Hiibel was not whether civil liberties could be
125. Klein, supra note 4, at 366. The rationalization is "a reasonable belief that [an individual
stopped under reasonable suspicion] was armed and presently dangerous." Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979).
126. Police Organizations Amicus, supra note 89, at 5 (citing a U.S. Department of Justice
report). The Police Organizations Amicus Brief notes that the threat to police is not limited to
"obviously risky situations such as hot pursuit of drug suspects or burglars," but rather "[e]ven
seemingly routine police work, performed by foot patrolmen and traffic officers, can be fatal." Id. at
4-5.
127. Id. The Amicus notes that, therefore, officer safety interests are "very much implicated by
brief, but personal, investigative encounters like the one in this case." Id. at 5.
128. Id. According to this study, some fifty-three percent of those who killed officers "had a prior
criminal conviction .... And one-fourth of those individuals were on parole or probation at the time
of the killing." Id. (internal citations omitted).
129. The "objective evidence linking past arrests and convictions to officer safety threats cannot
be dismissed as 'speculative."' Id. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Klein, supra note 4, at 377 (noting that police could maximize their effectiveness if they
were allowed to "approach whomever they wished, reasonable suspicion or not, and demand
answers to all sorts of questions, including and beyond mere identity. But the Fourth Amendment is
not properly viewed as a mere impediment to making an arrest.").
132. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
impeded for the sake of effective and safe police work (they were under
Terry and other cases), but rather whether the police safety exigency, or
indeed any other exigency, could justify the limited seizure for which the
Nevada statute provides-the seizure of a person's identity.
In DeFillippo v. Michigan, the Court upheld the lawfulness of an arrest
where the officer believed the defendant's conduct violated a valid city
ordinance compelling self-identification-an ordinance later declared
unconstitutional for vagueness.' 33 The Court said that since there was no
controlling precedent which clarified the constitutionality of the ordinance,
the ordinance was presumptively valid. 134 The Court continued that officers
themselves must not speculate as to the constitutionality of the laws they are
enforcing, "with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to
see its flaws."' 3 5  Therefore, because the officer in DeFillippo did not
question the ordinance before acting upon it 13 6 and because the Court found
the officer's action reasonable, 3 7 we may infer that the Court found this
self-identification ordinance not to be, on its face, such a "grossly and
flagrantly unconstitutional" law.' 38
But DeFillippo was important in another respect. Justice Brennan, in
his dissent, illustrated a dilemma facing the individual stopped under
reasonable suspicion and compelled to identify himself or herself.'39
Brennan said that this ordinance forced such individuals "who chose to
remain silent... to relinquish their right not to be searched [pursuant to a
search incident to arrest].' 140
Author Alan Hallock described this "bootstrapping" as "charg[ing] the
person [stopped] with failing to dispel [the officer's] reasonable suspicion
concerning the underlying circumstances that justified the initial stop, [and]
basing the seizure on 'probable cause' to believe that the detainee has
refused to produce identification."' 14' Essentially, if the officer stops a
person with reasonable suspicion and the particular state has a stop-and-
identify statute, the person must identify himself accordingly. If he does
not, the officer may arrest the person for a violation of that statute and
133. 443 U.S. 31,33-34 (1979).
134. Id. at 37.
135. Id. at 38. The Court noted that "[s]ociety would be ill-served if its police officers took it
upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to
enforcement." Id.
136. Id. at 33-34.
137. See id. at 37. However, the dissent said that the Court focused upon the wrong question in
determining whether evidence seized could be included-the question was not whether the search or
seizure was authorized by state law, but rather whether the search or seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan believed the ordinance
was clearly unconstitutional. Id.
138. Id. at 38. In DeFillippo, in order to assess the propriety of the officer's actions, the Court
merely assumed, arguendo and without resolving the issue, that contrary to the specifications of the
stop-and-identify statute which provided the officer with his authority to arrest, "a person may not
constitutionally be required to answer questions put by an officer in some circumstances." Id. at 37.
139. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Klein, supra note 4, at 370.
140. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Hallock, supra note 18, at 1072.
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perform a search pursuant to arrest. If any evidence is found relating to the
crime for which the officer legally stopped the individual, or another crime,
the officer could "bootstrap" the initial arrest for violation of the stop-and-
identify statute on to subsequent criminal charges based upon this evidence.
Indeed, the arrest for failure to identify could be seen as a way for the officer
to establish probable cause and/or gather evidence for the activity for which
he had only reasonable suspicion. The "first cause" in this chain of events is
that the person stopped must refuse to identify him or herself in violation of
a stop-and-identify statute-without a stop-and-identify statute and the
person's refusal to abide by it, any search of the person is invalid unless the
officer can develop probable cause from some other circumstance
surrounding the stop.
Justice Blackmun, in his DeFillippo concurrence, addressed Justice
Brennan's concern that the Court's decision will allow the State to
"circumvent the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment."1 42
He acknowledged that this ordinance could escape constitutional review if
arrestees were released for lack of evidence as a result of the search incident
to arrest.143 However, Justice Blackmun stated that there was no evidence
the "ordinance [was] being used in such a pretextual manner."1 44  He
continued speculating that if evidence showed police routinely arresting, but
not prosecuting, individuals under the ordinance, any police claim of good-
faith reliance on the ordinance's constitutionality would be rebutted.141 If
the Court subsequently concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional,
the arrestee could have the evidence obtained in the search incident to arrest
suppressed. 146
This apparent "Hobson's choice," as Justice Brennan called it,14 is in
the end simply a "reasonable suspicion" gremlin created and solved by
Terry. How is it that an individual stopped pursuant to Terry knows that an
officer has reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the officer's stop or a
pat-down search of the individual? Terry subjects individuals who refuse to
be stopped and frisked--even though officers have only reasonable
142. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 40-41.
144. Id. at41.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan posed this same scenario in his Kolender
concurrence. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 368-69 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). He
noted that "[m]ere reasonable suspicion does not justify subjecting the innocent to such a dilemma"
and that only
probable cause, and nothing less, represents the point at which the interests of law
enforcement justify subjecting an individual to any significant intrusion beyond that
sanctioned in Terry, including either arrest or the need to answer questions that the
individual does not want to answer in order to avoid arrest or end a detention.
Id. at 369, 369 n.7 (emphasis added).
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suspicion-to a similar Hobson's choice as the one illuminated by Justice
Brennan: face a pat-down frisk or face search incident to arrest. 148  The
Terry Court said that the governmental interests in "swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat," as well as
officer safety, justified subjecting individuals who may be innocent to such
police actions. 149  Even though under the statute at issue in Hiibel, an
individual is forced to speak (as opposed to being forced to stop and be
frisked per Terry), it is not a stretch to believe similar governmental interests
could justify the majority's decision in Hiibel, especially given the very
specific and "limited" intrusion 150 under the Nevada statute. 51
2. Fifth Amendment
The Court said that in order for Mr. Hiibel to be entitled to the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, his communication must
be "testimonial, incriminating, and compelled." 152  However, the Court
declined to resolve whether stating one's name or producing identification
documents is testimonial, i.e., an "assertion of fact."' 153 The Court said that
even assuming arguendo that the disclosure was testimonial, Hiibel's case
failed as the disclosure presented "no reasonable danger of incrimination." 15
4
The Court stated that Hiibel was not successful in explaining how disclosing
his name would be used against him in a criminal case,155 and that "absent a
reasonable belief that [his] disclosure would tend to incriminate him,"' 5 6 the
148. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1968) (concluding that "there must be a
narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime").
149. Id. at 20, 24.
150. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text for a discussion on the limited nature of the
intrusion associated with requiring identification.
151. Therefore, Hiibel, finding constitutional a statute compelling the disclosure of a person's
name only when that person is stopped with reasonable suspicion under Terry, hardly warrants the
moniker Klein assigned to the majority's decision - "The Criminalization of Silence." Klein, supra
note 4, at 357.
152. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2460 (2004). Steinbock found it
surprising that the Hiibel Court did not cite the fact that under Miranda, compelled and testimonial
"booking questions" (i.e., questions normally attendant to arrest and custody), designed to obtain
biographical information for administrative reasons, are exempt from the usual interrogation rules.
Steinbock, supra note 29, at 720. He noted that in another case, eight justices concluded that
responses to these 'booking question[s]' . .. are an exception to the Miranda rules" and that
"applying this administrative question exception to 'core' Fifth Amendment compulsion" might
have implications for the officer's similar compulsion for Hiibel's identification. Id. (citing
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990)).
153. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2461. The Court noted that "[a]s best we can tell, [Hiibel] refused to identify himself
only because he thought his name was none of the officer's business." Id.
156. Id. As precedent, the Hiibel majority cites Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)
(quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896)), stating that to invoke the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination privilege, an individual must have a "reasonable ground to apprehend
danger.., from his being compelled to answer .... [This] danger... must be real and
appreciable[,]... not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character... so improbable that no
reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct." Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
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Fifth Amendment did not trump the will of the Nevada legislature in
enacting the stop-and-identify statute. 
157
The majority then noted the importance of the narrow scope of the
statute's disclosure requirement for identification, as well as the uniqueness
and universality of one's identity. 158 It claimed that revealing one's identity
is "so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in
unusual circumstances." 159 In addressing this "insignificance" of identity to
criminal prosecution, the Court reasoned that "who has been arrested and
who is being tried" is known in criminal cases; indeed, "[e]ven witnesses
who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment [still] answer when their names are
called to take the stand."
' 160
Side-stepping the issue of whether revealing one's identity is
testimonial,16' however, the Court declined to address the "unusual
circumstances" under which revealing one's identity would be
incriminating. 162 For example, they neglected to answer the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would
apply in a case where furnishing one's identity during a Terry stop "would
have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the
individual of a separate offense," and if so, "what remedy must follow.',
163
It is possible in such a situation that the Court could impose either a use
remedy or a more strict immunity remedy.64
Though the Court did not make the stretch, it is not difficult to envision
the "unusual circumstance" where providing one's name to police would
provide police with such "a link in the chain of evidence." Ironically, the
majority cites this particular "unusual circumstance" as one of the strong
governmental interests served by obtaining a suspect's name during a Terry
stop: in this era of cross-linked criminal history databases, police could
obtain information that "a suspect is wanted for another offense."
' 165
In such a case, it is likely that a suspect would have knowledge of the
crimes he or she committed and for which crime he or she is wanted, and
could therefore have a reasonable belief that his or her self-identification
disclosure would be incriminating. And as long as that compelled self-
identification disclosure is testimonial, an issue that the Hiibel majority
declined to resolve, the suspect purportedly would have a Fifth Amendment
157. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See infra notes 203-18 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of issues relating to
whether a name is "testimonial."
162. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 57 for a discussion of such possible remedies in the Byers case.
165. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
right not to be compelled to respond to police, thereby rendering the statute
unconstitutional in such a situation. 166  So, under the Nevada statute,
provided the Court concludes the substance of giving one's name is not
"testimonial," the innocent have no such Fifth Amendment privilege and
must provide such identity information, while the "wanted" most likely can
decline the officer's command. 1
67
B. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens's dissent is largely based upon Fifth Amendment
concerns. 168  He asserted that the statute singles out "a highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities," 16' namely those that,
because they are stopped under Terry's requirement of reasonable suspicion,
are already the focus of a criminal investigation. 70  Justice Stevens
maintained that the constitutional "right to remain silent" should encompass
those individuals who are the subject of such focus. 17 1 He suggested the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not so "circumscribed"
as to allow the compulsion of even the narrow identification exception that
the Nevada statute mandated and the majority allowed. 7 2
The Byers Court, however, in upholding the constitutionality of a stop-
and-identify statute whereby participants in auto accidents were compelled
by law to stop and leave their names and addresses at the scene of the
accident, discussed this singling out of a "highly selective" group. 17 Byers
noted that the Fifth Amendment privilege "applied only in 'an area
permeated with criminal statutes," 174 and "not in 'an essentially noncriminal
and regulatory area of inquiry."" 175 It is logical that statutes which compel
disclosure in an area "permeated with criminal statutes" would present the
higher risk that the disclosure would be incriminating and therefore
unconstitutional.
In Byers, however, even though an individual in a traffic accident might
have committed criminal acts and his self-identification might lead to
criminal prosecution, the individual could not claim the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent because, unlike those in areas "permeated with
criminal statutes," the statute "was not intended to facilitate criminal
convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from
166. See id. at 2460-61.
167. This point is explored further in the analysis of Justice Stevens's dissent. See infra notes
195-97 and accompanying text.
168. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2461 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2462.
172. Id.
173. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (citing as examples Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79
and Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,47 (1968)).
174. Id. at 430 (emphasis added). These areas permeated with criminal statutes included
registration of members of a Communist organization, federal gambling tax and registration, and
firearm registration. See Hallock, supra note 18, at 1077.
175. Byers, 402 U.S. at 430.
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automobile accidents."17 6  The Byers Court noted that the required self-
reporting was essential to this non-criminal statutory purpose. 17 7 Thus, the
"highly selective" group moniker was not applicable for Fifth Amendment
purposes where the goal was non-criminal.
Likewise, if it could be said that the primary concern of the Nevada
statute in Hiibel is non-criminal and not meant primarily "to facilitate
criminal convictions,"' 78 then Justice Stevens's assertion that the Fifth
Amendment should apply because the statute is not directed 'at the public
at large,' but rather 'at a highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities, ' 1 79 is without merit. However, in Justice Stevens's
favor is the fact that the Nevada stop-and-identify statute, indeed all such
statutes, apply in the realm of Terry stops, in which an officer must have
reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed or is about to commit a
criminal offense. Hence, the Nevada statute could be characterized as
relating much more closely to the "facilitat[ion of] criminal convictions"
than to regulating settlement of civil penalties in auto accidents, as in
Byers. 180
The majority upheld the statute at issue in Hiibel despite these Fifth
Amendment "incrimination" concerns. 18' They reasoned that Hiibel's
"refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and
appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him or...
'furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute' him." 182 The
facts indicate that Hiibel simply had no such belief. 183 If he did entertain
this belief, the question of whether his belief was reasonable would have to
176. See id. at 428-31, 434 (emphasis added). The defendant could not claim the privilege
because the Court noted the individual was not confronted with the "substantial hazard[] of self-
incrimination" by being compelled to reveal his information in a non-criminal area of inquiry. See
id. at 429,433-34 (emphasis added).
177. Id.at431.
178. Id. at 430. But see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text for the governmental interests
implicated in Terry stops. The majority implied that these governmental interests were necessary to
properly analyze the Nevada stop-and-identify statute at issue in Hiibel when the Court noted that
"[t]he principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a
Terry stop." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004). However, one
would be hard-pressed to explain how the governmental interest in informing the stopping officer
that the suspect is wanted for another offense implicates a primarily "non-criminal" concern.
179. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)).
180. The Court has said that an individual's ability to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination is reduced "[wihen a person assumes control over items that are the legitimate object
of the government's noncriminal regulatory powers ...... Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 558 (1990). Therefore, it might be possible to strengthen the Court's
rationale in Hiibel, where the Terry stop occurred in and around Hiibel's vehicle, by invoking the
state's power to regulate motor vehicles and ensure traffic safety.
181. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
182. Id. at 2461 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
183. Id.
213
be answered before the disclosure could be said to be "incriminating."
Therefore, even though a compelled disclosure may occur in an area
potentially permeated with criminal statutes (in Hiibel the stop was to
investigate a criminal assault), it is still only incriminating pursuant to
Hoffman v. United States where the person so compelled has reasonable
cause to apprehend the danger from a direct answer. 184  Justice Stevens
found the disclosure incriminating,'85 while the majority would have so
found only if it determined Hiibel's reason for not answering was based
upon a reasonable belief that giving his name would result in self-
incrimination. 1
86
Justice Stevens, citing Davis and later Justice White's concurrence in
Terry, continued by claiming that it was settled law that police cannot
compel citizens to answer their questions regarding unsolved crimes. 187 He
noted that an individual such as Hiibel, who was subjected to questioning
based upon reasonable suspicion, should not have lesser protection than an
individual who is subjected to questioning based upon probable cause or an
individual who is indicted and on trial (or "the unindicted target of a grand
jury investigation"). 188
First though, one must not lose sight that the "questioning" of which
Justice Stevens spoke is extraordinarily circumscribed here in Hiibel: the
officer merely requested the individual's name, the answer to which is not
even clearly testimonial. 89 Second, because probable cause is a higher
standard than reasonable suspicion, one may think of conditions indicating
probable cause as more akin to the majority's "unusual circumstances."' 90
Where an officer has probable cause, the suspect would probably meet the
Byers burden of having a reasonable belief that sharing his identity with
police in such a situation would subject the suspect to a "substantial hazard[]
of self-incrimination."' 191 If, for example, an officer has probable cause to
arrest a specific individual, and seeks out him or her, then the individual
providing identification information would subject him or herself to arrest
and imminent prosecution. Therefore, to allow the compulsion of such
identification information would likely violate the suspect's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
But again, whether such compulsion is permitted would depend wholly
upon whether the Court determines that such identification is testimonial.' 92
For if such a disclosure is not testimonial, then the suspect's belief that
184. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also infra note 196-98 and accompanying text.
185. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 2461.
187. Id. at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. See infra notes 203-18 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding whether a
disclosure is "testimonial."
190. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text for a discussion on the Hiibel majority's
"unusual circumstances."
191. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying
text.
192. See infra notes 211-22 for a discussion on how the Court could make such a determination.
214
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giving his name would be self-incriminating cannot bar compulsion of self-
identification on exclusively Fifth Amendment grounds, even if the
compulsion is by an officer acting with probable cause.' 93  If self-
identification is ultimately determined to be testimonial, then Justice
Stevens's concern about "greater" or "lesser protections" here is moot
because under the Fifth Amendment, "protections" of testimonial statements
clearly hinge upon whether that compelled self-identification statement is
incriminating. 194
Justice Stevens's sentiment is carried further by author Klein's assertion
that "[a]ccording to the majority's reasoning, then, the less guilty one is, the
fewer constitutional protections one has."'1 95 Klein worried that "[a]n
innocent person subjected to a Terry stop can never show that his name
might be used to incriminate him.., because he has done nothing
incriminating" whereas a guilty person can make such a showing.196 Again,
this reasoning must assume that identification information is "testimonial,"
for if it is not, then all persons, whether guilty or not, must comply with the
officer's request for identification. 1
97
But assuming that such information is testimonial, the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, even prior to Hiibel, was still subject to
a showing that compelled testimonial information sought to be protected is
"incriminating" (i.e., "the witness reasonably believe[d such information]
could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used").' 98 Therefore, only testimonial statements that a person
reasonably believes are incriminating are protected. Klein lamented the
"perverse result" of the majority's decision, stating that if Ted Bundy
reasonably believes that revealing his name is incriminating, whereas Justice
Kennedy holds no such reasonable belief, then "Ted Bundy has a
constitutional right to remain silent when asked for his identity during a
Terry stop; Justice Kennedy does not."' 99 Essentially, Klein here tried to
193. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (holding that a voice exemplar used only
for identification purposes and not for testimonial content did not violate the Fifth Amendment).
194. See supra notes 152-60 and infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text for a discussion on
what constitutes "incriminating" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
195. Klein, supra note 4, at 386.
196. Id.
197. See infra notes 203-18 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding whether a
disclosure is "testimonial."
198. Kastigar v. United States 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
199. Klein, supra note 4, at 386. As odd as this possible outcome may appear, the Court has
recognized situations where those of dubious character and conduct have apparently been afforded
greater protections than those who walk the "straight and narrow." For example, the Court has held
that while the government may compel certain business records from its citizenry, the government
may not do so from those who have engaged in illegal businesses or behavior. See, e.g., Marchetti v.
undercut the majority decision solely by wondering what the Court would do
in the "unusual circumstances" to which the majority referred.
Practically, under the Nevada statute, the officer will compel the self-
identification during the Terry stop and only later will learn whether the
circumstances of the stop were "unusual." When faced with these facts, the
Court could resolve this situation with a use restriction on the identification
itself and on all of the "fruit" that the identification provided 200 (unless of
course the State can show that the "independent source ' 20  or "inevitable
discovery ' 20 2 doctrines apply). This result may be acceptable if the
governmental interest of officer safety is found to be weighty enough, and
found to be advanced by the self-identification statute. The officer would
then be protected during the stop, while guilty individuals would have the
evidence-which was based upon a self-identification that was compelled,
testimonial, incriminating, and therefore protected by the Fifth
Amendment-tossed out.
Justice Stevens then asserted that the disclosure in Hiibel was clearly
testimonial, noting that the Court has recognized Fifth Amendment
protection "if the disclosure in question was being admitted because of its
content rather than some other aspect of the communication., 203 He found it
significant that the communication must be made in response to a police
officer's question because, in the context of a case involving the Sixth
Amendment's confrontation clause, the Court stated that "testimonial"
"applies at a minimum" to statements given in response to police
interrogations.20 4  By extension, Justice Stevens claimed that police
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti, the Court allowed an individual, residing in a state
where gambling was illegal, to invoke his right against self-incrimination and refuse to declare his
earnings from gambling sought by the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 60-61. The Court concluded
that under these circumstances, the mere completion of Marchetti's tax form and payment of his tax
created for him a "real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination. Id. at 48. One could therefore
lament that this precedent would afford to Al Capone rights not enjoyed by Justice Kennedy or
General Powell. This disparity is not a judicial interpretation problem, but rather a difficulty
inherent within the Fifth Amendment's right against compelled self-incrimination. The compelling
of "required records" is but one situation where a government-imposed obligation does not create the
impermissible risk of self-incrimination for the law-abiding (and is therefore permitted), yet
nonetheless does so for those whose compelled disclosure would likely expose their illegal acts.
Still, as plain as this seems in the area of paying one's taxes, it is less so where an individual
subjected to the immediate stress of being stopped by a police officer is compelled under penalty of
arrest to identify him or herself.
200. A use restriction would likely resolve the self-incrimination issues given the Court's decision
in Chavez v. Martinez, stating that, contrary to the view of the Ninth Circuit, it is not until the
compelled statements are actually used in a criminal case that a violation of the Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause occurs. 538 U.S. 760, 767-69 (2003). Of course, such compelled
statements may still violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, even if not "used" at
trial. See id. at 774.
201. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805, 813-16 (1984).
202. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-48 (1984).
203. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2463 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Court has said that "[tihere are very few instances in which a verbal statement ... will not
convey information or assert facts. The vast majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial
and, to that extent at least, will fall within the (Fifth Amendment] privilege [against self-
incrimination]." Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213-14 (1988).
204. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 68 (2004)). Regarding interrogation in a Fourth Amendment context, the Court has said
216
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questioning during a Terry stop is an interrogation and, therefore, answers to
those questions are testimonial.20 5
This determination of whether revealing one's identity is testimonial, as
we have seen in the case of an "unusual circumstance," is the linchpin of
figuring out whether the Fifth Amendment privilege applies. 206 Though
Justice Stevens believed that this determination in Hiibel must be answered
in the affirmative,0 7 the Court has thus far not resolved this issue, despite
having decided a number of cases which bear upon it.
218
In United States v. Wade, the Court found that although a robbery
suspect was required to use his voice "within hearing distance of the
witnesses" and to utter specific words used by the robber, such use and
words acted merely "as an identifying physical characteristic," and did not
"speak [of] his guilt., 20 9 The Court clarified a testimonial statement, unlike
the "non-testimonial" compelled words above, would require the suspect "to
disclose any knowledge he might have., 2 10  This presents a problem under
the statute in Hiibel, for while the statute is limited to requiring a suspect
that "[i]nterrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not,
by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." Id. at 2458 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 216 (1984)). Delgado noted that police questioning cannot be considered a "detention" under
the Fourth Amendment "[u]nless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not
responded .... ." Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216. And, that if "the police take additional steps ... to
obtain an answer" after a person refuses to answer the questions, it is then that "the Fourth
Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective justification to validate the detention or
seizure." Id. at 216-17.
205. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text. As author Hallock noted, a decision clearly
finding self-identification non-testimonial would require the Court to "break new ground." Hallock,
supra note 18, at 1079. Although, as we have seen above, if the person whose identification is
sought is also the registered owner of the vehicle in which he was stopped, these considerations
would be rendered moot by the fact that the officer would most likely possess the individual's
identification information as a result of running a computer check on the individual's license plate.
See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
207. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Hiibel case concerned
a testimonial communication and that "the compelled statement at issue in this case is clearly
testimonial.").
208. See infra notes 209-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of various inconsistent cases
addressing compelled disclosures in this area and attempting to determine how the Court would
determine whether or not a compelled self-identification is testimonial.
209. 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967). However, Justice Fortas in his dissent thought that "history
and tradition... command[ed] that an accused may stand mute," even in this instance, and that
compelling him to speak is the kind of forced "volitional act" ("more than passive, mute assistance
to the eyes of the victim or of witnesses") within the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. at 260-61 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Fortas
thought that the "insidious doctrine" of Schmerber v. California, permitting the compulsion of blood
evidence from the body of the accused, should not be applied in Wade. Id. at 261-62.
210. Id. at 222. The Court has elsewhere said that "the [Fifth Amendment] privilege is a bar
against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or
accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it." Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
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only to identify himself, it clearly compels an individual to disclose his
knowledge: in this case, the knowledge of his name. However, the
information disclosed merely identifies the individual and does not, except
in "unusual circumstances," "speak of his guilt" the way compelling answers
to other direct police inquiries (such as the question "did you assault this
woman?") would.
The Court noted this distinction in the Byers plurality. In Byers's
statutory reporting scheme, the Court stated that "[d]isclosure of name and
address is an essentially neutral act" which "identifies but does not by itself
implicate anyone in criminal conduct.",2 11 The Court allowed the
compulsion of such identification information here, although its release
might have had "consequences" to the compelled individual, because the
Byers statute implicated the state's power to regulate automobiles and thus
was essentially non-criminal.212 The Court opined that whether revealing
one's identity will "lead to inquiry that in turn leads to arrest and charge...
depend[s] on different factors and independent evidence., 2 3  Therefore,
using Wade, the Byers Court rejected the notion that, even if there was a
"link in the chain of evidence" to convict the person compelled to release
such information, such disclosures are automatically made "communicative
or testimonial" where such information, as here, was provided for an
essentially non-criminal purpose. 1
In Doe v. United States, the Court again warned that one must not
confuse "the requirement that the compelled communication be 'testimonial'
[and] the separate requirement that the communication be
'incriminating. ' ' 21 5  The Court stated plainly, "that, in order to be
testimonial, [the] accused's communication must itself, explicitly or
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information., 21 6 In this case,
the Court determined that a compelled consent directive did not violate an
individual's privilege against self-incrimination even though it, without
identifying any records or acknowledging their existence, forced an
individual to authorize foreign banks to disclose his records.2 17 The Court
said that this disclosure was non-testimonial because, like providing "a
211. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 432,434 (1971).
212. See id. The Court said that a name, as "linked with a motor vehicle" in this case, "is no more
incriminating than [a] tax return ...." Id. at 433-34.
213. Id. at 434. The Court found that
[h]ere the compelled disclosure of identity could have led to a charge that might not have
been made had the driver fled the scene; but this is true only in the same sense that a
taxpayer can be charged on the basis of the contents of a tax return or failure to file an
income tax form. There is no constitutional right to refuse to file an income tax return or
to flee the scene of an accident in order to avoid the possibility of legal involvement.
Id.
214. See id. at 432-33.
215. 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988) (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 210 (emphasis added). The Court reiterated the tenet that the Government must locate
the evidence it intends to use against a suspect not by the suspect's deeds or words, but rather "by
the independent labor of [the Government's] officers." Id. at 215 (internal quotations omitted). If
the Government relies on the suspect's "truthtelling," the disclosure is testimonial. See id.
217. Id. at 203, 219.
218
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handwriting sample or voice exemplar," the suspect was not "compelled [in
order] to obtain any knowledge he might have.,, 21 8 A compelled statement
revealing one's identity, however, relates a fact clearly within the knowledge
of the individual, and is therefore not "non-testimonial" according to Doe.
Given these confusing signals from the Court, how then would the Court
determine whether or not a compelled self-identification is testimonial? The
Court provided a clue with its long-standing principle that protection of the
Fifth Amendment privilege is "as broad as the mischief against which it
seeks to guard .... Under the facts of Byers, the Court determined that
the compelled self-identification served the traffic-safety purpose of the
statute at issue, and was not intended to aid in the conviction of drivers who
violated a criminal statute.220 Similarly, under the facts of Hiibel and given
the Court's ruling in Byers, it was not unreasonable for the Court to sidestep
the issue of whether compelled self-identification is testimonial because the
disclosure served officer-safety interests and was not a mischievous attempt
merely to facilitate criminal convictions (indicated by the fact that the statute
was specifically limited to identification only, and did not compel the person
to reveal any additional information). 22  Therefore, because the statute's
primary purpose was non-criminal, even if Hiibel was convicted of a
separate crime as a result of his disclosure, the Court would likely have still
determined that neither the testimonial nature of his statement compelled
under the statute, nor, as a consequence, the constitutionality of the statute,
was implicated.222
Turning next to the question of whether the Hiibel disclosure was
"incriminating," Justice Stevens reiterated the Court's holdings that
compelled testimonial disclosures that could lead to incriminating evidence
are privileged, and suggested the majority had read the Fifth Amendment's
protections too narrowly by not giving due consideration to disclosures
which might furnish links in the evidentiary chain.223 He believed that this
statute was merely a useful law enforcement tool to obtain information of
218. Id. at 217 (internal quotations omitted).
219. Byers, 402 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
459-60 (1966); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (quoting Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
220. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 433-34.
221. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3).
222. This could be the case even in the "unusual circumstance" of a "wanted" individual if the
clear purpose of the statute is non-criminal. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 432-33 (stating that complying
with the statute at issue "does not provide the State with 'evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature' within the meaning of the Constitution .... It merely provides the State and
private parties with the driver's identity for, among other valid state needs, the study of causes of
vehicle accidents and related purposes, always subject to the driver's right to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege concerning specific inquiries.").
223. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2463-64 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
219
"incriminating worth., 2 24  After all, he posited, why else would an officer
ask for such information, and the Nevada Legislature require its disclosure,
only in circumstances warranting reasonable suspicion? 225 Justice Stevens
asserted that any compelling governmental interest in officer and bystander
safety, when dealing with individuals who might be or might have been
engaged in criminal activities, was "sufficiently alleviated by the officer's
ability to perform a limited patdown search for weapons" under Terry.226
However, these statements ring hollow in light of the genuine officer safety
concerns during a Terry stop, but not directly addressed by Terry.227
Justice Stevens warned as well that, given the existence of police
databases, a name can provide a wealth of information about the suspect that
might be useful in criminal prosecution, and not merely in unusual
circumstances.228 However, this incrimination concern is less significant
given the Court's holdings that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the
collection of fingerprints or blood (and therefore DNA) evidence, which can
also provide a wealth of information given the existence of police
databases-though such information may be clearly incriminating-because
such items are clearly non-testimonial. 229 So, the fact that self-identification
224. Id. at 2464.
225. Id. The Court has previously questioned the state's interest "in putting a man in jail because
he doesn't want to answer something." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 54 app. (1979) (emphasis
deleted).
226. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. Also, the Nevada Supreme Court found that
given the frequency of criminal violence and its risk to officer safety, "[t]he public interest in
requiring individuals to identify themselves to officers when a reasonable suspicion exists is
overwhelming." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 2002).
228. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
223 (1967). Blood (and therefore DNA) evidence of a suspect, which may be compelled because
such evidence is non-testimonial, may be incredibly incriminating if it is found at a crime scene.
The way the FBI analyzes DNA, "the odds of a match ... are well more than one in a hundred
billion .... [U]nless you have a twin, you're statistically two thousand times more likely to win the
Publisher's Clearinghouse sweepstakes (I in 50,000,000) than to have a DNA profile that matches
anyone else." Ann Meeker-O'Connell, How DNA Evidence Works,
http://www.howstuffworks.com/dna-evidence4.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2005); see also Norah
Rudin, DNA Untwisted, http://www.forensicdna.comlDNA_Untwisted.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2005) (discussing issues pursuant to the use of DNA in the criminal context). In Schmerber, the
dissent vigorously disagreed that blood evidence was non-testimonial, finding "that the compulsory
extraction of [the accused's] blood ... had both a 'testimonial' and a 'communicative nature."'
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting). Noting that those "words are not models of
clarity and precision," Justice Black maintained that the blood evidence was testimonial because it
was used "to prove that [the accused] had alcohol in his blood at the time he was arrested," and it
was communicative "in that the analysis of [his] blood was to supply information to enable a witness
to communicate to the court and jury that [the accused] was more or less drunk." Id. at 774. By
quoting Justice Holmes in a case in which he rejected an argument that compelling the accused to
submit to the demand that he model a blouse violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the majority suggested that Justice Black's rationalization, despite the wholly
incriminating nature of the blood evidence when analyzed, was "based upon an extravagant
extension of the Fifth Amendment," which "in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and
compare his features with a photograph in proof." See id. at 763 (internal quotations omitted).
Therefore, the Court reiterated the "testimonial" distinction as one where the privilege against self-
incrimination is not violated when the suspect is compelled to be the source of "real or physical
evidence," but is violated when "communications" or "testimony" is compelled. Id. at 764.
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provides a wealth of potentially incriminating information does not
automatically trigger Fifth Amendment protections unless the Court
determines the self-identification is testimonial.
C. Justice Breyer's Dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg
Justice Breyer asserted that any laws which compelled responses to
questions posed by police violated guaranteed Fourth Amendment
protections and were therefore invalid.230  He claimed that the Court's
acknowledgement, in Berkemer v. McCarty, that a Terry-stopped suspect
does not have to respond to police questioning, 23' and the Court's twenty-
year history of consistent comments on the matter, provided "strong dicta
that the legal community typically takes as a statement of the law., 23 2 He
maintained that there were no good reasons to reject this Fourth Amendment
precedent, as it was based as well on sound Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
and administrative considerations.23 3  In addressing these considerations,
Justice Breyer invoked the "slippery slope" argument, concerned about how
far the State could go in requiring a stopped individual to answer an officer's
questions.234 It is likely the Court will have to address this issue given the
wide variance of stop-and-identify statutory language in use by the states
employing such statutes.235
Additionally, Justice Breyer reiterated the important point by
questioning how an officer, during a Terry stop, could determine the
"unusual circumstances" which would render the disclosure of the detainee's
23name incriminating. 36 This determination requires the officer to possess
facts not within his knowledge or his observational field. In most
conceivable cases, an officer simply cannot know whether the person he
stopped under Terry will incriminate himself by releasing his name; it is
230. Hibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. An "officer may ask the [Terry] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the
detainee is not obliged to respond." 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
232. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra note 48 for the history of Court
dicta on this issue.
233. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer would not "begin to erode [this] clear rule with
special exceptions." Id. at 2466.
234. See id. at 2465-66.
235. See Klein, supra note 4, at 361 (noting that, for example, New Hampshire's stop-and-identify
statute allows for an officer to demand the person stopped reveal his "name, address, business
abroad, and where he is going") (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (2003)); see also Katya
Komisaruk, When Do You Have to Give Your Name at the RNC Protests?,
http://www.lawcollective.org/article.php?id=204 (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) (comparing the Nevada
stop-and-identify statute to a similar one in New York).
236. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that even in such
"unusual circumstances" that would render an identity disclosure incriminating, the majority still
reserved judgment about whether such compulsion is allowed. Id.
only after the officer has run the name through his database and found an
outstanding warrant that the officer is made aware of the incriminating
nature of the individual's self-identification. 237 The Court can evaluate the
validity of the officer's claim of, for example, reasonable suspicion, since
the officer must point to specific facts leading him to the conclusion that
such reasonable suspicion existed.238 If the officer cannot point to such
facts, the individual's due process rights have been violated, and any
information which flows from such a Terry stop is disregarded.239 Similarly,
a use limitation could be applied to resolve Justice Breyer's concerns and
guarantee an individual's constitutional rights. For example, if self-
identification produced incriminating information, that information could be
excluded from admission into a criminal proceeding.
Next, Justice Breyer maintained that the majority presented no evidence
as to how the Berkemer rule has significantly interfered with law
enforcement, nor any other convincing reason for changing it. 240 Although
it may not be clear how this rule has "significantly interfered" with law
enforcement, it is apparent, contrary to Justice Breyer's rationale, that there
are serious officer safety concerns during a Terry stop not addressed by
Terry.
241
It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan's Kolender concurrence
acknowledged, in a backhanded way, the possible need for greater
protections than Terry offered, noting that "[w]here probable cause is
lacking, we have expressly declined to allow significantly more intrusive
detentions or searches on the Terry rationale, despite the assertion of
compelling law enforcement interests.' 242 Justice Brennan implied here that
detentions or searches, so long as they were not "significantly" more
intrusive than those provided for by Terry, might be allowed with
compelling law enforcement interests.
243
The majority performed the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
balancing test and concluded in Hiibel that the governmental interests are
237. As we have seen, the Court has reserved for another day the determination of what is to be
done in such a case, and, as mentioned above, this will turn largely on the determination of whether
self-identification is "testimonial." See supra notes 203-18 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (discussing the Fourth Amendment
requirement that seizures be based upon "specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate
interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers").
See also Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457.
239. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 53 (reversing a conviction based upon the finding that officers had no
basis for their reasonable suspicion determination).
240. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra note 231 and accompanying
text.
241. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
242. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 363 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added);
see Klein, supra note 4, at 380. This does not conflict with the assertion set forth most clearly by
Klein that "[t]he balancing test established by Terry was not meant to be anything other than a
narrow exception to the default rule of probable cause." Klein, supra note 4, at 385. The important
question here is how narrow the exception is and whether, as Justice Brennan may have suggested,
there were any others besides Terry.
243. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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compelling enough to warrant the narrow disclosure required under the
statute.244 However, Justice Breyer disagreed, stating that he would not
"begin to erode [the] clear rule [of Terry] with special exceptions," like the
one here in Hiibel, allowing the compulsion of one's name by an officer
with reasonable suspicion.245
V. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Hiibel Court, for the first time, allowed officers to compel an
answer to their request for identification from an individual stopped with
reasonable suspicion.246 Despite what may be the majority's slight parsing
of words, this holding represents a break from the Court's dicta.247
However, this "crossing of the line," while dramatic in its symbolism, is less
so in its practical realities.
As the Court has acknowledged, most individuals do not feel free to
refuse to answer questions posed by officers, especially one as innocuous as
"what is your name. 24 8 So, it is likely that there will be no actual difference
for the average individual stopped pursuant to the constitutional Nevada
stop-and-identify statute. Only those individuals who are more legally
savvy and "stand up for their rights, 249 or those who are more criminally-
inclined, inebriated, and/or naturally rebellious, are likely to be
disadvantaged by this ruling.
Further challenges to stop-and-identify statutes are inevitable, however,
given their inherent constitutional implications and the broad range of such
statutes currently "on the books. ' ' 210 If answers beyond simple self-
identifications are compelled (such as to questions asking for the suspect's
address, or the nature and direction of the suspect's actions), these statutes
will most certainly be attacked under the Fourth Amendment for the breadth
of their seizures.
244. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
245. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. Hiibel does not expand the scope of a Terry
stop or provide any other "basis on which to stop and detain persons," nor does it allow officers to
"demand proof or documentation of identity," nor does it "permit officers to randomly stop persons
and demand that they identify themselves." Beverly A. Ginn, Chief's Counsel: Stop and Identify
Laws, THE POLICE CHIEF (Sept. 2004), available at
http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display-arch&articleid=382&issue
_id=92004.
247. See supra note 48 for the history of Court dicta on this issue.
248. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 364.
249. See Stephen Henderson, Police Can Require Names, Supreme Court Rules,
http://www.officer.com/article/article.jsp?id=14130&siteSection=l (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
250. See Klein, supra note 4, at 359-61.
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Even though some may characterize the Hiibel decision as a departure
from the "brighter" line rule regarding seizures afforded by Terry,251 the pre-
Hiibel line seems less bright252 when one considers the exceptions made for
blood evidence and fingerprinting. 253 As the Court has acknowledged,
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is not amenable to crystal clear doctrine,
but must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
25 4
Additionally, it is inevitable that the Court will have to address Fifth
Amendment concerns of such statutes, and most notably resolve whether the
identification or further information sought is "testimonial." Given the
vociferous split on the issue of compelled disclosure of even one's identity,
it is unlikely the Court will consider as non-testimonial the disclosure of
further information requested by police. Also, it is only a matter of time
before the Court will be required to clarify the constitutionality of a
compelled self-identification in the "unusual circumstances" where the
individual has a "reasonable belief' that the identification information he or
she is forced to reveal is "substantially incriminating." Though this
clarification may be rendered moot if the Court was to determine that self-
identification is not testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes, if the Court
does determine self-identification is testimonial evidence, there will be
serious Fifth Amendment issues in the enforcement of stop-and-identify
statutes generally: the Osama bin Laden and General Colin Powell scenario
illustrates only one bizarre example of what could result given the Court's
ruling and the issues which remain unclear in Hiibel's wake. It is perhaps
the Court's "omissions," appropriate as they may be given the facts of the
case, which are the most dramatic and important features of Hiibel.
Citizens must always be on guard for Court precedent that seriously and
unjustifiably encroaches upon their civil liberties. Hiibel, however, as it
stands, and despite the inevitable histrionics which have and will accompany
the decision, is not one of those cases. Klein is concerned that now "[a]n
innocent person, approached by the police without probable cause, simply
has no Fifth Amendment right to remain silent., 255  In addressing such
concerns, one must only evaluate the Court's past words in light of the
current state of civil liberties. In Byers, Justice Black was concerned that the
plurality's opinion, if agreed to by a majority of the Court, "would
practically wipe out the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled
self-incrimination., 256 Justice Brennan's dissent in the same case lamented
the "rivers of confusion [which flowed from the plurality's] lake of
251. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2466 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Klein, supra note 4, at 385.
252. In her article, Klein noted the importance the Court placed on the relation between Fourth
and Fifth Amendment issues, and cautioned against "the dangers of analyzing Fourth Amendment
claims in a vacuum." See Klein, supra note 4, at 376 n.1 15, 387-89.
253. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
255. Klein, supra note 4, at 387. Author Klein apparently finds of no import the fact that this lack
of the "right to remain silent" only applies to an individual's name, and only for certain in those
states that possess such narrowly drawn stop-and-identify statutes as the one in Nevada.
256. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 459 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
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generalities. ' 257 And, notably, Justice Douglas worried that the Court's
decision in Terry took the United States "a long step down the totalitarian
path. 258
Further, the dissent in the Nevada Supreme Court's Hiibel decision
noted that the majority's holding "weakens the democratic principles upon
which this great nation was founded" and that "[t]he undermining of that
foundation is a harm more devastating to our country and to this State than
any physical harm a terrorist could possibly inflict. ' 259 Although these vocal
few might disagree, the sky of civil liberties certainly has not fallen as a
result of Terry and Byers. And, as with those cases when they were decided,
only time will tell what Hiibel hath wrought. Given the extremely
circumscribed language of the Nevada statute at issue, 260 the answer might
likely be "not much."
Robert A. Hull26'
257. Id. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
258. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
259. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1210 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti, J., dissenting).
260. The language requires that one stopped with reasonable suspicion must reveal only his name
to police. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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